Transcript of press conference given by Sir Nigel Wicks, Committee on
Standards in Public Life, in London on Thursday, 21 November 2002
From Eileen Fox for Radio Technical Services
Sir Nigel Wicks
Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen. Welcome to this occasion on which we are
publishing the eighth report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life,
this report is on standards of conduct in the House of Commons and the
publication of this report marks the conclusion of our inquiry process into
the regulation of standards of conduct in the House of Commons.
What I intend to do is to summarise very briefly what is in the report and
then take a few questions afterwards and my colleagues here will answer the
questions just as much as I do. Let me say that in preparing this report we
had twin objectives in mind. We wanted to ensure a system of regulation in
the House of Commons which delivers public competence while carrying the
confidence of the House of Commons itself. We have made 27 recommendations
and we believe that those recommendations should achieve the objectives
that I have just described.
What are our recommendations intended to do? They are intended to
strengthen the ability of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards to
operate in an independent way. We want too to emphasise the role, the
pivotal role, of the Committee on Standards and Privileges as the real
decision-maker in the whole process. Of course the final decisions on these
matters are sometimes made by the House of Commons itself, but the
Committee on Standards we see as the pivotal actor, the pivotal element in
the process. We want to ensure that the Committee on Standards is seen to
be impartial. We want to introduce further elements of external scrutiny
into the process and we want to make the system clearer and more
transparent. Why do I emphasise clarity and transparency? Because we think
that clarity and transparency will help buttress public confidence.
Turning to particular recommendations, we recommend that the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Standards should have a non-renewable fixed term
appointment, it is a matter for the House to decide how long, but we
suggest between 5 – 7 years, and we recommend too that the Parliamentary
Commissioner should be given direct powers to call for witnesses and
papers. We recommend also that the Parliamentary Commissioner should be
appointed by the House of Commons, but should not be an employee of the
House. We found in taking evidence that there was some confusion about his
exact status and in that recommendation that I have just referred to, we
want to bring clarity to what is now a little confused.
We recommend too that no one party should have an overall majority on the
Committee on Standards and Privileges, and also in that connection we
recommend that no Parliamentary Private Secretaries – that is Members of
Parliament who act as aides, they are not members of the government but
Parliamentary Private Secretaries who act as aides to Ministers – should
serve as members, no Parliamentary Private Secretaries serving as members
of the Committee.
We go on to recommend that there should be an investigatory panel with an
independent chair to hear evidence to help the Committee on Standards
decide in the most serious and contested cases. This investigatory panel
would be called upon if the Committee itself decided that it requires the
advice, the help of the investigatory panel, as I say in the most serious
and contested cases. It would have beside the independent Chair two senior
Members of Parliament on the panel, but these would not be members of the
Committee on Standards.
We think too that the Committee should publish its reasons in full for any
decision, and we also recommend that the Code of Conduct for Members of
Parliament should be reviewed, at least during each parliamentary cycle,
and that there should be consultation with external bodies as part of that
review process. We suggest that before it is put to the House of Commons
for approval, the Committee on Standards and Privileges should do some
public consultations.
Now these several recommendations here require putting actually into
practice and we considered how the recommendations should be implemented,
and we concluded that they should be implemented by means of standing
orders of the House. We came to that conclusion because we believe that if
you use standing orders they have the advantage of being quick and
flexible. We concluded too that while statute enacting these proposals,
these recommendations in statute, is in our view an unnecessary step at
this stage, we would not rule the statutory route out for the longer term.
Now as the Committee said in its very first report way back in 1995 I
think, the test of whether its recommendations made there were sufficient,
or whether further change was needed, would be the operation of the
recommendations in practice, and it said that in relation to the
Commissioner in particular. So in this report we have carried out a review
of the operation of the system in practice, and we have concluded that it
needed strengthening and making clearer and more transparent in the ways
that I have described.
And in conclusion let me say that we believe that the adoption of the
measures that I have recommended, that our Committee has recommended, will
enable the House of Commons to maintain and enhance in what are challenging
times the highest standards of conduct which are so essential for an
institution at the heart of our democracy.
Now my colleagues and myself stand ready to answer any questions that you
might have on our report. I recognise you have not had a great deal of time
to assimilate it. I should have said that we have published the report in
full and we have published actually a summary which sets out the
recommendations and sets out the major considerations which led us to the
recommendations we made.
Question (James Lyons, Press Association)
On the point that the independent investigator is going to be brought in on
these most serious or complex charges, who would decide when that kicks in,
and surely that is going to undermine the Parliamentary Standards
Commissioner?
Sir Nigel Wicks
No, I think it is the reverse. How is this process going to be invoked? It
could well be in cases where the Parliamentary Commissioner believes that
for some reason or other he has been unable to get to the bottom of the
complaint, and he in those circumstances could actually make a
recommendation himself, entirely up to him to decide whether, to the
Committee to decide whether to call in the investigatory panel.
Another time could be when the case is put there by the Commissioner, the
Member of Parliament denies still, and then there is a difficult situation
for the Committee, and it would be valuable I think in those circumstances
and strengthen the whole process if the Committee had another investigative
arm, another way of getting at the truth. And the key to the investigatory
panel, they would be able to do something that the Commissioner cannot do,
and that is to summon and cross-examine witnesses. If I could get a little
bit technical for a moment, there was a report written some time ago by I
think a joint committee of the two Houses, which Lord Nichols chaired,
which set out 6 tests that you should have in these sorts of processes, and
one of those tests was an ability to call witnesses, and another test was
an ability to cross-examine witnesses. So no I think the reverse is true, I
think this strengthens the process and I think actually in practice will
strengthen the position of the Commissioner. Let me say I think it is the
view of the Committee, and we say so, that it will be a pretty rare case
that will go to the investigatory panel.
Committee member (John MacGregor)
Can I add one point to that, because I think it is important. We
recommended this in our sixth report and the House of Commons at that time
rejected it, and we have slightly amended it, the proposal, but it is
fundamentally the same. I think one of the main reasons for advocating it
again is this question of the Nichols six questions of natural justice. The
present system in the House of Commons does not have natural justice in it
in the case of serious and contested cases. As the Chairman has just said,
there are two parts of the natural justice six principles that are missing,
and I think that this proposal is actually in the interests of fairness and
natural justice to MPs themselves. We had some MPs giving us evidence that
they thought that the process was not actually in accordance with the best
processes of law and natural justice, and I think that is right, and I
therefore hope that the House of Commons will see that this is actually a
proposal to be fair to members.
Question (Greg Hurst, The Times)
Did you in the Committee consider the current penalties available to
members who are judged to have fallen below the standards required, and did
you think for example that 20 days suspension has in the past adequately
reflected the gravity of some cases?
Sir Nigel Wicks
Yes we did consider that. We didn’t actually consider in the detail of
whether it should be 20 days, 30 days or whatever, but we did suggest in
recommendation 14, we recommend that the House should take steps to
introduce additional financial penalties as a sanction for breach of the
Code of Conduct. So we make a recommendation that financial penalties,
which could operate with suspension if that was thought right, should be
introduced. So the answer to your question is yes, penalties were
considered and we want an additional set of penalties.
Question (David Henkie, Guardian)
Could I first of all just clarify something. On the inquiry panel, are you
proposing that the people who chair it cross-examine, or that the MP has
the chance to cross-examine the people giving evidence? It is an
interesting point because when the Guardian was involved in the cash for
questions thing, we were actually called before the Commissioner who had a
Legal Advisor who did cross-examine our evidence, but Neil Hamilton wanted
the power to cross-examine as an MP with his own lawyer. And the second
thing is on the financial penalties, have you worked out a scale of what
sort of level that should be and for what seriousness, taking account that
MPs are quite well paid and other things.
Sir Nigel Wicks
To take your second point first, no we have not recommended a scale, we
think this is for the House. Now on your first point, and I am going to be
a little lengthy here because it enables me to say something about the
investigatory panel. If you look at Recommendation 12F, it says the
investigatory panel should be able to appoint Counsel who could
cross-examine witnesses, so they would be able to appoint Counsel who would
be able to cross-examine witnesses, so that is the answer to that. But let
me just elaborate a little bit more why you need an investigatory panel in
our view in these serious cases. Those of you who follow these matters
closely know that some of these serious and contested cases can be
enormously complex.
We have a Standards Committee at the moment of 11 members and we came to
the conclusion, though the Committee is an admirable body, to actually
investigate with cross-examination and so on in these very difficult cases,
for 11 people to do it is not the most efficient way. There is another
point which a witness put to us, is that sometimes this is inevitable with
11, especially something that may go over more than 1 day, one member may
be called out for some reason or another, a constituent comes, and again it
is not right and according to national justice if you have a panel which is
in a sense investigating somebody where they could have a very serious
penalty, that someone is not in the room all the time.
So that is another reason we have suggested an investigatory panel of an
independent legal chair from outside the House and two MPs of substantial
seniority, drawn from different parties, not members of the Committee on
Standards and Privileges. We also, and this may sound detailed but I think
it is an important point, we say that the senior members from whom the
panel would be drawn, from whom the two would be drawn, should be nominated
or listed as it were at the beginning of a Parliament so there can be
no suggestion that particular MPs had been chosen for particular cases. But
I do emphasise that we believe that this strengthens the process and adds,
besides the points that John MacGregor has mentioned, it actually
strengthens the process as well as being fair to the member.
Question (Rita Chakribati, BBC)
Would the MP involved be allowed to employ counsel as well?
Sir Nigel Wicks
We say that they would be allowed to employ counsel, and I am looking for
the exact one: an MP whose case is being considered by the panel should
have the right to call and examine witnesses and to receive reasonable
financial assistance in those cases.
Question (Chris Smith, E-Politics.com)
Can I follow up on that point? Isn’t the danger there then that you will
have a situation where the barristers are brought in and it comes down to
an argument about complex legal points, and outsiders looking in think this
is MPs up to games again?
Sir Nigel Wicks
No, this is not a matter of complex legal points. The purposes of an
investigatory panel is to try on the basis of the evidence put to it to
come to a judgment on what the facts are. Indeed this is what the
Commissioner does, he tries and does his best to get to the basis of what
the facts are, his finding of facts. What also the Commissioner does, and
we see the investigatory panel doing, is to say in their view do the facts
constitute a breach of the code? But it is not a sort of precise legal
argument type issue, complex legal arguments that you are referring to, it
is an investigatory panel of facts basically.
Committee member (Professor Alice Brown)
Can I just add by saying that the investigatory panel will then make
recommendations back to the Committee, so it goes back to the Committee
again and that is another important stage.
Committee member (Chris Smith)
Could I just add for further clarity, any ultimate decision on whether the
code has been breached, how severe that is and what a penalty should be is
up to the Committee on Standards and Privileges. We felt it was very
important to enshrine the sovereignty of the Parliamentary body in the
process, but to buttress that with as much independent assistance as we
possibly could.
Question:
Your press notice describes these measures as introducing further elements
of external scrutiny. I can’t think of any.
Sir Nigel Wicks
Well the investigatory panel is one.
Question:
Yes, but at present I can’t think of any external ...
Sir Nigel Wicks
One is the Commissioner himself.
Question:
But the Commissioner is an employee of the House at the moment.
Sir Nigel Wicks
Yes, and we are saying that he shouldn’t be.
Question:
What I am trying to get at is would this change the historic principle that
the House of Commons is sovereign and therefore you are bringing in an
external ...
Sir Nigel Wicks
No it doesn’t for the exact reason that Chris Smith had just said that the
Commissioner makes a report of his findings to the Committee, he also makes
a judgment of whether those findings of fact constitute a breach. We a
moment ago described the role of the investigatory panel in doing that. It
all goes back to the Committee and it is the Committee’s responsibility,
and in these matters it is very important to actually have clear
responsibility, this is again a point about clarity which is so important.
It is the Committee’s responsibility to make the recommendation to the
whole House of Commons on what should happen if the member is found to have
made a breach of the code.
Committee member
Could I just add a point there, because you referred to the fact that the
Commissioner is actually appointed by the House of Commons Commission and
is therefore paid by the House of Commons, but actually the recommendation
we have made of a fixed tenure greatly strengthens the independence of the
Commissioner.
Sir Nigel Wicks
The other point, again worth mentioning I think in this context, we are
recommending too that the Commissioner should have direct powers to call
for witnesses and for papers. And again this will strengthen the
independent position of the Commissioner to carry out his role and I think
in a very useful way.
Committee member
And to publish an annual report which again gives the opportunity of
independent points of view.
Question:
There is an interesting recommendation you have got saying that MPs must
not lobby members of the Committee. Given the whole of Parliament, and I
have certainly benefited from this, is based on whispered conversations in
corridors. How on earth are you going to police or prove that, or will
there be some onus on the member of the Committee to basically have to
report this in some way, because Parliament is just run on whispers
frankly.
Sir Nigel Wicks
I think colleagues here, many of us have experience of disciplinary panels
that operate both in the public sector and to an extent in the private
sector, and it is a very important rule in those cases that those people on
the panel hold themselves aloof as it were and anything that they take as
evidence has to be reported to the panel as a whole, or in this case to the
Commissioner it could be, in a proper way. And we are saying that those
general rules which apply throughout public life, and indeed parts of
private life, should apply equally in the House of Commons and we would
expect that to happen.
Committee member
It is important to recognise I think the precise recommendation we have
made on this, which is that the rule against lobbying members of the
Committee on Standards and Privileges should be part of the Code of
Conduct. So any member who breaches that rule of the code runs the risk
that whoever they attempt to lobby may actually end up reporting them as
breaching the code of conduct. So it is actually quite a powerful
prohibition.
Committee member
And I think you have to see it also in the context of the changes we are
proposing to the composition of the Committee as well.
Question:
We are here talking about all these changes and there may be a number that
are recommended here, but surely the public aren’t really going to believe
that Parliament has cleaned up its act until these things are enshrined in
law and we have a genuinely independent body?
Sir Nigel Wicks
Well I think you need to see here that there are a lot of elements of
independence. I come back to the Commissioner. We propose the Commissioner
is not an employee, or a word that was used in our evidence, regarded as a
servant of the House, appointed by the House but for what his job is he is
totally independent. He has a power to publish an annual report, well we
say he has not a power to but he should publish an annual report which can
range widely. For example if he doesn’t think he has got a big enough
budget the annual report would be the place to say it. We are also advising
that on the Code the Committee should put it out for public comment, and
those public comments will no doubt be made public.
So if the Committee did not take notice of what was said in public about
what should be in the Code, that would all be public as well. So that is
again another external element in actually setting up the Code. And the
third point, I don’t want to go back to it because we have discussed it, is
this investigatory panel with an independent legal chairman. So I think
there are a lot of independent elements in this process. A final point, I
think if you look at our recommendations as a whole, you will see that they
do bring in a good deal of clarity and transparency into the whole
operation of the system. In fact the system was set up as a result of
recommendations by this Committee 6 or 7 years ago. We in what we are doing
now is we are looking at how that establishment of the system has been
carried out and how it has been implemented and what has happened, and we
are actually building on the good work of the original members of this
Committee and as I say I think we are doing this in a way which does
introduce and strengthen the independent elements.
(End of transcript)
